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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The plaintiff and appellant is The Doctors Company ("TDC"), an insurance 
company. There are two defendants and appellees: G. Gregory Drezga, MD, the named 
insured on a TDC policy for medical malpractice; and Ms. Heidi Judd, personally and on 
behalf of her son, Athan Montgomery. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction, pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78A-3-102(3)0) (2008), over this appeal of the orders and final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Summary judgment was properly entered by the district court in favor of 
Appellees pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Among the statutory 
provisions that may be relevant include Utah Code Sections 31A-21-105, 31A-21-106, 
and31A-21-303. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The ultimate responsibility of this Court will be to assign loss arising from the tragic 
circumstances of Athan Montgomery's birth. The parties to this case include The 
Doctors Company ("TDC"), which seeks to invalidate a professional liability insurance 
policy that it issued in 1996; Dr. G. Greggory Drezga ("Dr. Drezga" or "Drezga"), who 
applied for and obtained the insurance policy to cover his medical practice; and Athan 
Montgomery, who had the misfortunate to be born under tragic circumstances that led to 
a malpractice action and judgment against Dr. Drezga. 
This lawsuit, which began nearly a decade ago, represents an enduring campaign by 
an insurer to avoid paying a valid and significant claim against the professional liability 
policy that it issued to Dr. Drezga. TDC launched this declaratory action against the 
empty chair of TDC's insured: owing to Dr. Drezga's unexplained absence, TDC sought 
to be excused from maintaining its coverage of Dr. Drezga because of his alleged "non-
cooperation." Next, TDC cancelled the policy and sought to deny coverage based on 
alleged misrepresentations that it discovered upon review of Dr. Drezga's application for 
malpractice insurance. TDC subsequently sought and currently seeks to re-characterize 
its termination of the policy as a rescission in order to deny coverage Finally, TDC 
challenges the order entered by the district court that held it responsible for the legal fees 
incurred by the court-appointed attorney for Dr. Drezga. 
The district court entered summary judgment against TDC. On appeal, TDC asks this 
Court to transfer TDC's financial loss to its absent insured, Dr. Drezga. Reversal would 
likely leave Dr. Drezga without the means to satisfy the judgment against him. 
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FACTUAL RECORD 
Twice before, this Court has grappled with issues arising from the tragic 
circumstances of Athan Montgomery's delivery and birth. Given that the briefs of 
Appellant TDC and Appellee Judd both retread this ground, and given the Court's 
previous exposure to the general factual background, the utility of repeating this exercise 
would likely be limited. 
Instead, given the allegations made by TDC against Dr. Drezga, it is notable and 
important to highlight the absence of certain facts from the record before this Court. For 
example, consider the following: 
• There is no evidence in the record indicating that Dr. Drezga has ever been 
aware of the malpractice suit that was brought against him. 
• There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Dr. Drezga disappeared in 
a purposeful attempt to evade the malpractice action. 
• There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Dr. Drezga intentionally 
failed to assist in the defense of the malpractice action. 
• There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Dr. Drezga declined 
to appear at any proceeding during the malpractice action. 
• There is no evidence in the record indicating that Dr. Drezga has ever been 
aware of the declaratory action brought against him by TDC. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its appeal, TDC asks the Court to reverse the judgment of the district court and 
retroactively rescind the medical malpractice insurance coverage TDC provided to Dr. 
Drezga. However, public policy militates against this result, given that the purpose of 
medical malpractice insurance is to fulfill the twin goals of protecting the insured from 
the financial consequences of his or her clinical errors while simultaneously providing 
financial compensation to those patients injured as a result of those errors. Here, the end 
result of allowing TDC to retroactively rescind Dr. Drezga's coverage would be to punish 
those parties that relied on such coverage, namely, Dr. Drezga himself Indeed, because 
insurance companies are in the best position to evaluate whether an applicant qualifies for 
coverage, public policy dictates that TDC's retroactive rescission argument be rejected. 
Second, TDC's contention that Dr. Drezga violated his duty of cooperation is 
unfounded, namely because there is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Drezga ever became 
aware of (let alone failed to cooperate in the defense of) the medical malpractice claim 
brought against him. Much like a deceased, disabled, or incapacitated person, Dr. 
Drezga's absence does not equate to non-cooperation and TDC's argument to that effect 
should be rejected. 
Third, where, as here, the district court appointed counsel to represent Dr. 
Drezga's interests, it is appropriate that the fees for such counsel be paid by TDC, 
particularly given that TDC has failed to repay the premiums funded by Dr. Drezga and 
arguably has used those premiums to fund the case against him. Thus, in this unique 
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situation, this Court should affirm the district court's conclusion that TDC is responsible 
for paying Dr. Drezga's defense costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TDC SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETROACTIVELY AND 
BELATEDLY RESCIND ITS INSURANCE COVER AGE OF 
DR. DREZGA. 
This Court should bring this longstanding case to a just conclusion by affirming 
the district court's entry of summary judgment against TDC. The district court correctly 
concluded that TDC may not retroactively rescind its coverage of Dr. Drezga for 1997 
since TDC elected instead to cancel its policy with Dr. Drezga.1 
Public policy supports this result. Rescission in this case would thwart the purpose of 
insurance; namely, to protect the insured from the financial consequences of professional 
errors while providing adequate compensation to innocent victims of medical 
malpractice. 
TDC justified its cancellation of Dr. Drezga's policy on the basis of alleged 
misrepresentations made by Dr. Drezga in his application for insurance. What is not 
known is whether these alleged errors resulted from innocent mistake, misunderstanding, 
or confusion, or whether these misrepresentations were truly the product of malicious 
intent. It is at least possible that the foreign-born Dr. Drezga misunderstood what 
information was sought, given the legalistic language of the insurance application. For a 
person without a native command of the English language, it is at least conceivable that 
1
 Rather than reiterate the applicable legal analysis, Dr. Drezga joins Section 1 of 
Appellee Judd's brief. 
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confusion over a verb tense—perhaps, say, misunderstanding whether the question 
wanted to know whether he was presently involved in a malpractice case, as opposed to 
whether he had previously been involved in such a case—could have led Dr. Drezga to 
have inadvertently provided inaccurate information. Since TDC notes that Dr. Drezga 
had prior malpractice claims that settled, it is possible that Dr. Drezga may not have 
disclosed those incidents out of a belief that he had an obligation to maintain the 
confidentiality of those settlements. 
Thus, based on the posture of this case, this Court is left with a record where it 
must be assumed, arguendo, that Dr. Drezga's application contained misrepresentations. 
While TDC conveniently attests that it would not have extended a policy to Dr. Drezga 
had it been aware of these misrepresentations (see R. 175-199), such testimony may be 
nothing more than retroactive speculation. Perhaps Dr. Drezga could have provided an 
adequate explanation for the apparent inaccuracies. Perhaps TDC would have 
nevertheless been willing to issue a policy in exchange for a greater premium. 
What is certain is that retroactive rescission in this case would punish the parties 
that relied on TDC's issuance of insurance to Dr. Drezga. For starters, once armed with a 
policy from TDC, Dr. Drezga had no reason to seek other insurance. Presumably he 
engaged in his practice of medicine believing that TDC would both protect his interests 
and provide for his patients in the event of tragedy. So, too, did Dr. Drezga's employer 
rely on the fact that TDC had issued insurance to cover his medical practice. Most 
tragically of all, Heidi Judd came to rely on the fact that her physician was covered by 
malpractice insurance. 
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This Court should not permit TDC to retroactively rescind Dr. Drezga's insurance 
policy, lest the insurance industry view such an outcome as an invitation to skimp on the 
applicant screening process. After all, if insurers believed that they could retroactively 
rescind their policies by discovering misrepresentations after the inception of a 
malpractice case, insurers would have less incentive to commit precious resources to the 
initial screening process. Indeed, a potential insurer, at the time it receives an application 
for insurance, is in the best position to investigate the applicant and potentially prevent a 
chain of tragic reliance. For this reason, it is vital that Utah law provide incentive for 
insurers to invest the time and resources necessary to screen applicants before issuing 
professional liability insurance. 
II. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. DREZGA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
NON-COOPERATION. 
This Court should reject TDC's contention that, by sole virtue of his 
disappearance, Dr. Drezga violated his contractual obligation under the policy to 
cooperate in the defense of the malpractice claim against him. There is absolutely no 
evidence in the record to suggest that Dr. Drezga ever became aware of the malpractice 
action. Nor is there any evidence that might suggest that Dr. Drezga disappeared in order 
to avoid a lawsuit against him. The singular fact in the record is this: Dr. Drezga has 
simply vanished. 
The unexplained disappearance of Dr. Drezga should not provide TDC with an 
excuse to terminate his insurance policy. An insurer's duty to defend its insured survives 
the death of its insured; it endures during any period of an insured's disability; and it 
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continues notwithstanding the incapacity of its insured. TDC has not been so bold as to 
suggest that an insurer could escape its contractual responsibilities in these circumstances 
based on the non-cooperation of the dead, disabled, or incapacitated. After all, one of the 
very purposes of insurance is to safeguard individuals, their estates, injured third parties, 
and society from the consequences of these calamities. By the same reasoning, the 
unavailability of Dr. Drezga should not permit his insurer to disclaim valid claims against 
Dr. Drezga's insurance policy. 
III. TDC SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEGAL FEES 
INCURRED TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ITS INSURED FROM 
TDC'S DECLARATORY ACTION. 
This Court should affirm the district court's order to ensure that Dr. Drezga's 
court-appointed counsel may be fairly compensated for defending Dr. Drezga from this 
declaratory action filed by TDC. The singular distinguishing factor of this case is the 
absence of Dr. Drezga and TDC's decision to pursue litigation against the empty chair of 
its insured. 
This Court should reject TDC's suggestion that an impermissible conflict would 
result from its payment to the attorney appointed by the district court to represent its 
absent insured. TDC contends that: 
were he present, it is hard to believe that [Dr.] Drezga would accept the 
services of counsel paid by his adversary. Such counsel would have an 
immediately apparent conflict of interest in serving two diametrically-
opposed masters. 
See Aplt. Br. at 62. 
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This contention betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Utah's Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Dr. Drezga's counsel owes his duty of loyalty to Dr. Drezga. 
Assuming that Dr.Drezga—or an appropriate court—consented to allow his counsel to be 
paid by a third-party, as is permissible under the governing ethical rules, Dr. Drezga's 
counsel's duties are owed solely to Dr. Drezga. The payment of fees does not transform 
a third-party payer into a client. Dr. Drezga's counsel would not have two masters. 
TDC also relies on Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Mayfield, 923 
S.W.2d 590 (Texas 1996). In Mayfield, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a district 
court order that had compelled an insurance carrier to pay the litigation costs for counsel 
for a workers' compensation plaintiff in a dispute between the parties. The Mayfield 
court held that the district court had abused its discretion and exceeded its inherent 
authority when it ordered the payment of attorneys' fees in the absence of an authorizing 
statute or contract. 
It is not surprising that TDC touts Mayfield as persuasive authority. But the 
present circumstances are both extraordinary and clearly distinguishable from Mayfield. 
First, the insurer in Mayfield was not pursuing action against a missing party. Second, 
unlike here, the adjudication of the parties' rights in Mayfield would have little effect on 
third parties. Third, the insurer in Mayfield did not first cancel its insured's coverage 
before seeking to rescind it. Fourth, the Mayfield court refused to pay up-front costs of 
litigation, whereas affirmance of the district court's order here would result in payments 
to Dr. Drezga's counsel only after the successful defense of Dr. Drezga's interests. 
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Additionally, though the insurer in May field objected to an order compelling it to 
fund its adversary, the insurer had not retained funds belonging to its insured. In this 
case, TDC argues that "Funding for Drezga's defense in this lawsuit, if it is to be 
obtained at all, should come from a source other than TDC." Aplt. Br. at 63. This 
position is somewhat ironic because, due to TDC's original retention of Dr. Drezga's 
premiums, the funding for TDC's attack on Dr. Drezga's contractual rights could be said 
to have begun with funding from Dr. Drezga. To be sure, TDC also argues that "[a] 
refond of policy premiums was not feasible due to Drezga's disappearance." Aplt. Br. at 
17. Yet TDC did not pay the premiums into the court. Nor did TDC convey these funds 
to the State of Utah as lost or unclaimed property. Instead, TDC retained these funds 
and initiated legal action against its missing insured. Thus it could fairly be said that 
TDC kept Dr. Drezga's money and used it to fund litigation against him in absentia. 
Finally, given that the district court agreed that TDC's attack on Dr. Drezga's 
contractual rights was without merit, fundamental fairness and equity suggest that TDC 
should bear the costs of the defense rather than the prevailing party. This Court should 
affirm that TDC is responsible for paying the costs of defense incurred by Dr. Drezga's 
court-appointed counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above and in the brief of Appellee Judd, the orders and 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of March, 2009. 
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